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Abstract
Recent research indicates a lot of attempts to create an Intrusion Detection System that is
capable of learning and recognizing attacks it faces for the first time. Benchmark datasets
were created by the MIT Lincoln Lab and by the International Knowledge Discovery and
Data Mining group (KDD). A few competitions were held and many systems developed.
The overall preference was given to Expert Systems that were based on DecisionMaking
Tree algorithms. This work is devoted to the problem of Neural Networks as means of
Intrusion Detection. After multiple techniques and methodologies are investigated, we
show that properly trained Neural Networks are capable of fast recognition and
classification of different attacks. The advantage of the taken approach allows us to
demonstrate the superiority of the Neural Networks over the systems that were created by
the winner of the KDD Cups competition and later researchers due to their capability to
recognize an attack, to differentiate one attack from another, i.e. classify attacks, and, the
most important, to detect new attacks that were not included into the training set. The
results obtained through simulations indicate that it is possible to recognize attacks that
the Intrusion Detection System never faced before on an acceptably high level.
1 Introduction
The constant development of computer technologies is undeniable. Lots of companies
set up shops on the Internet and customers interest in the Web shopping and information
gathering is growing rapidly. The Internet became a public tool for communication.
Networking has become a very important part of our society. Some devices such as
refrigerators, air conditioners, microwaves, and toasters are becoming part ofHome Area
Networks.
With this incredible growth of technology we are facing an increased need for more
security. The accessibility, openness, and complexity of the Internet have provided the
need in more sophisticated security of information systems. There is no such company
which would be willing its assets stolen, and nobody would like to come home to a
burned-down apartment or a house because somebody decided an oven would be fun to
crack. Malicious usage, attacks, and sabotage have been on the rise as more and more
computers are put into use. Connecting information systems to networks such as the
Internet and public telephone systems further magnifies the potential for exposure
through a variety of attack channels.
In this research we investigate the problem of Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), one of
very important components of computer/network security. An IDS by itself does not
prevent security brakes, but detects malicious use by monitoring unusual activity. This
unusual activity is capable of taking an unlimited number of forms.
Most IDS perform monitoring of a system by looking for specific
"signatures"
of
behavior. However, using current methods, it is almost impossible to develop
comprehensive-enough databases to warn of attacks. This is for three main reasons.
First, these signatures must be hand-coded. Attack signatures that are already known are
coded into a database, against which the IDS uses to check current behavior. This system
may be imagined as being very rigid. Second, because there is a theoretically infinite
number ofmethods and variations of attacks, an infinite size database would be required
to detect all possible attacks. This, of course, is not feasible. Also, any attack that is not
included in the database has the potential to cause great harm. One other problem is that
current methods are likely to raise many false alarms. So not only do novel attacks
succeed, but legitimate use can actually be discouraged.
This work offers a thorough analysis of current IDS models. We study and investigate the
benchmarks for this problem provided by the Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency (DARPA) and the International Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining Group
(KDD). These benchmarks and the experience of prior researchers are utilized to create
an IDS that is capable to learn attack behavior and is able to identify new attacks without
system update. In other words, we create a flexible system that does not need hand-coded
database of signatures, and that can define new attacks based on pattern, not fixed rules
provided by a third party. Neural Networks are chosen as the means of achieving this
goal. The use ofNeural Networks allows us to identify an attack from the training set,
also it allows us to identify new attacks, not included into the training set, and perform
attack classification.
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2 Neural Networks Overview
As the name implies, neural networks take a cue from the human brain by emulating its
structure. Work on neural networks began in the 1 940s by McCulloch and Pitts and was
followed by the advent of Frank Rosenblatt's Perceptron [2]. The neuron is the basic
structural unit of a neural network. In the brain, a neuron receives electrical impulses
from numerous sources. If there are enough agonist signals, the neuron fires and triggers
all of its outputs. A neural network neuron functions similarly. A neuron receives any
number of inputs that possess weights based on their importance. Just as in a real neuron,
the weighted inputs are summed and output based on a threshold function sent to every
neuron downstream. A barrage of positive inputs will provide a positive output and vice-
versa. The original Perceptron received two inputs, and gave a single output. Although
this system worked well for simple problems, Minsky demonstrated in 1969 that non
linear classifications, such as exclusive-or (XOR) logic, were impossible [14].
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I = 2, w x . Sirnrnation
Y = f(l) Transfer
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Path
Figure 1. Basic representation of an artificial neuron
In Figure 1, various inputs to the network are represented by the mathematical symbol,
x. Each of these inputs is multiplied by a connection weight. These weights are
represented byw. In the simplest case, these products are plainly summed, fed through a
transfer function to generate a result, and then output. This process lends itself to physical
implementation on a large scale in a small package. This electronic implementation is
still possible with other network structures, which utilize different summing functions as
well as different transfer functions [14].
It wasn't until the 1980's that training algorithms for multi-layered networks were
introduced to solve this problem, restoring faith in neural networks. A multi-layered
network consists of numerous neurons, which are arranged into levels. Each level is
interconnected with the one above and below it. The first layer receives external inputs
and is aptly named the input layer. The top layer provides the classification solution, and
is called the output layer. Sandwiched between the input and output layers are any
12
number of hidden layers. It is believed that a three-layered network can accurately
classify any non-linear function. Multi-layered networks commonly use more
sophisticated threshold functions, such as the sigmoid function. This is advantageous
because the sigmoid function's range is [-0.5, 0.5]; therefore, it prevents any individual







(there may be several
hidden layers)
Figure 2. Multi-Layer Perceptron Architecture
Basically, all artificial neural networks have a similar structure or topology as shown in
Figure 2. In that structure some of the neurons interface to the real world to receive their
inputs. Other neurons provide the real world with the network's outputs. These outputs
might be the particular character that the network thinks that it has scanned or the
particular image it thinks is being viewed. All the rest of the neurons are hidden from
view [14].
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2.1 Multi LayerPerceptron Neural Network
This is probably the most popular artificial neural network, which is being used today.
We briefly discussed this type of network in previous section: the neurons sum biased,
weighted inputs and pass it through a transfer function to produce the output. The
neurons are organized in a layered feed-forward topology. Such networks can model
functions of almost arbitrary complexity, with the number of layers, and the number of
units in each layer, determining the function complexity. Very significant issues in Multi
layer Perceptron (MLP) are the number of hidden layers and the number of neurons in
these layers. The number of input and output neurons is defined by the problem [38].
The most common example of a neural network training algorithm is back propagation.
There are modern derived algorithms, such as Levenberg-Marquardt and conjugate
gradient descent, are considerably faster in some cases. However under some
circumstances back-propagation still has advantages, and is the easiest algorithm to
implement and understand. Also, there are some heuristic modifications of back
propagation, which work well in certain areas.
In back propagation the gradient vector of the error surface is calculated. This vector
points along the line of steepest descent from the current point, so we know that if we
move along it a
"short"
distance, we will decrease the error. A sequence of such moves
(slowing as we near the bottom) will eventually find a minimum of some sort. The most
challenging part is to decide how large the steps should be. Large steps converge more
quickly, but may also overstep the solution or (if the error surface is very eccentric) go
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off in the wrong direction. A classic example of this behavior in neural network training
is in the progress of the algorithm, which moves very slowly along a steep, narrow,
valley, bouncing from one side across to the other. In contrast, very small steps may go in
the correct direction, but they require a large number of iterations. In practice, the step
size is proportional to the slope (so that the algorithms settles down in aminimum) and to
a special constant: the learning rate. The correct setting for the learning rate is
application-dependent, which is typically chosen by experiment; it may also be time
varying, getting smaller as the algorithm progresses [38].
Back-propagation algorithm can also be modified by the usage of a momentum rate: this
guarantees the movement in a set direction. If a few steps are taken in the same path, the
algorithm "picks up speed", what makes it possible sometimes to escape local minimum
and to shift quickly over flat spots and plateaus. That's why a number of epochs are
required for the algorithm to progresses iteratively. During each epoch the training sets
are input to the network, then the target and actual outputs are compared, and the error is
calculated. The given error is used to modify the weights, and then the algorithm repeats.
Initially, the network configuration is random. The training should be stopped in
following cases:
A given number of epochs is reached
When the error reaches the desiredmargin
When the error remains unchanged after completing a certain number of epochs.
15
2.2 RadialBasis Function Neural Network
Compared to the feed-forward network, the radial basis function (RBF) network is the
next-most-used network model. As the name implies, this network makes use of radial
functions. Figure 2.1 illustrates an RBF network with inputs xi,...,x and output y. The
arrows in the figure symbolize parameters in the network. The RBF network consists of
one hidden layer of basis functions, or neurons. At the input of each neuron, the distance
between the neuron center and the input vector is calculated. The output of the neuron is
then formed by applying the basis function to this distance. The RBF network output is
formed by a weighted sum of the neuron outputs and the unity bias [40].
Figure 3. Radial Basis Function Neuron.
MLP neurons are distinct by their weights and threshold, which give the equation of the
defining line, and the rate of the function fall-off from that line. Before the sigmoid or
other activation function is applied, the activation significance of the neuron is
determined through the use of a weighted sum. This sum is the product of the input
vector and the weight vector of the neuron.
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In contrast, a radial neuron is defined by its center point and a radius. In a radial neuron
the center is equivalent to the weights in MLP, and the radius value is stored as the
threshold. Therefore, a radial basis function network (RBF) has one hidden layer of
neurons, where each neuron includes a Gaussian activation function. Since this function
is nonlinear, it is enough to have only one hidden layer. As for the output, it is sufficient
to use a linear combination of these outputs (i.e., a weighted sum of the Gaussians) to
model any nonlinear function. The standard RBF has an output layer containing neurons
with identity activation function [38].
Based on research in this area it is possible to conclude that RBF networks have a number
of advantages overMLP:
They are capable of modeling nonlinear function using a single hidden layer,
which disengages design-decisions problems about numbers of layers.
A linear conversion in the output layer can be optimized using traditional linear
modeling techniques, which allow RBF network to trainmuch faster. [41]
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2.3 Self-Organizing Map NeuralNetworks
Whereas all the above-mentioned networks belong to supervised learning, Self
Organizing Map Networks (SOM) fits into unsupervised learning. The SOM was
developed by Kohonen [27]. While in supervised learning the training data set contains
input vector and corresponding output vector, in unsupervised learning the training data
set contains only input vector (corresponding output vector does not exist).
At first it is possible to think that it is very odd that the network can learn without outputs
-
what can it learn? But ifwe think about it, the answer is pretty simple
- SOM learns the
structure and the pattern of the data.
Therefore, one potential application for this kind ofnetwork is data analysis. The SOM is
capable of learning to recognize clusters of data and classify those data. When data are
classified and recognized, they can be labeled, so that the network becomes capable of
performing classification tasks. SOM networks can be also used for categorization, when
output classes are immediately available. In this case, the advantage of SOM is the ability
to highlight similarities between classes [38]. Another use of SOM is novelty detection,
which is associated with recognizing new, unknown, or unusual behavior.
As for the structure of SOM, they have only two layers: the input layer, and the output
layer of radial units, also known as the topological map layer. The units in the topological
map layer are laid out in space, typically in two dimensions. Figure 4 demonstrates basic
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Figure 4. Kohonen Self-OrganizingMap Architecture.
An iterative algorithm is used for training SOM networks. Originally, the set of radial
centers is initialized randomly. Then, the algorithm gradually adjusts those centers to
reflect the clustering of the training data. The iterative training procedure also arranges
the network so that neurons representing centers close together in the input space are also
located in the same manner on the topological map [14].
The basic iterative Kohonen algorithm simply runs through a number of epochs, on each
epoch executing each training case and applying the following algorithm:
Select the winning neuron, the one, which center is the nearest to the input case,
compute a Euclidean Distance between the pairs of neurons, and identify the





where xf and wjj are the elements of the vectors
X (input) and W (weights), n is
the number of input neurons, and m is the number of neurons in the Kohonen
layer.
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Update weights for the winning neuron and it's neighborhood: Aw,. =a(x -w,) ,
where a is a learning rate.
Iterate until min Euclidean Distance is satisfied, or no noticeable changes in the
feature map are found, or the desired number of iterations is reached.
The algorithm uses a time-decaying learning rate, which is set to perform the weighted
sum and verifies if the alterations become subtler as the epochs pass. This ensures that the
centers settle down to a compromise representation of the cases, which causes the neuron
to win.
The neighborhood is a set of neurons near the winning neuron. The neighborhood
decreases over time, so that originally it contains a large number ofneighboring neurons,
perhaps almost the entire topological map. After a number of iterations the neighborhood
will contain no neurons (i.e., consists exclusively of the winning neuron itself). Kohonen
algorithm adjusts weights not only of the whining neuron, but also the weights of the
neurons in its neighborhood.
Once the network has been trained to recognize structure in the data, it can be used as a
visualization tool to examine those data. The number of times each neuron wins during
the training stage can be counted, what makes it possible to see if distinct clusters have
formed on the map. Individual cases are executed and the topological map is observed to
see if some meaning could be assigned to the clusters. Once clusters are identified,
neurons in the topological map are labeled to indicate their meaning. After the
topologicalmap has been built up in this way, new cases can be submitted to the network.
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If the winning neuron has been labeled with a class name, the network can perform
classification. Otherwise, the network is regarded as undecided [38].
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3 Intrusion Detection Overview
Intrusion can be defined as any set of actions that attempt to compromise the integrity,
confidentiality or availability of a resource. A complete guidance document on Intrusion
Detection Systems is available at the National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) [4]. Effective intrusion detection is a difficult and elusive goal for system
administrators and information security researchers. The inherent complexity of computer
systems, the variety of potential vulnerabilities, and the skills ofmany attackers combine
to create a problem domain that is extremely difficult to address [36].
In the context of information systems, intrusion refers to any unauthorized access, not
permitted attempt to access or damage, or malicious use of information resources.
Intrusion can be categorized into two classes: anomaly intrusions and misuse intrusions
[34]. Thus, intrusion detection has traditionally focused on one of two approaches:
anomaly detection ormisuse detection.
Anomaly detection seeks to identify activities that vary from established patterns for
users, or groups of users. It typically involves the creation of knowledge bases compiled
from profiles of previously monitored activities. Anomaly detection is usually achieved
through one of the following
1) Threshold detection, detecting abnormal activity on the server or network, for
example abnormal consumption of the CPU for one server, or abnormal saturation
of the network.
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2) Statistical measures, learned from historical values.
3) Rule-based measures, with expert systems.
4) Non-linear algorithms such as Neural Networks or Genetic Algorithms [35].
The second approach, misuse detection, compares a user's activities with the known
behaviors of attackers attempting to penetrate a system. Anomaly detection often uses
threshold monitoring to identify incidents, while misuse detection is most often
accomplished using a rule-based approach. The misused detection is usually achieved
through one of the following:
1) Expert systems, containing a set of rules that describe attacks.
2) Signature verification, where attack scenarios are translated into sequences of
audit events.
3) Petri nets, where known attacks are represented with graphical Petri nets.
4) State-transition diagrams, representing attacks with a set of goals and transitions
[35].
Expert systems are the most common form of rule-based intrusion detection approaches.
Unfortunately, expert systems have little or no flexibility; even minor variations in an
attack sequence can affect the activity-rule comparison to a great enough degree to
prevent detection. Some approaches have increased the level of abstraction of the rule-
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based approach in an attempt to compensate for this weakness, with a side effect of
reducing the granularity of the intrusion detection process [36].
The most common method to identify intrusions is the method, which makes use of the
log data generated by special software, like firewalls, or the operating system. It is
possible that a manual examination of those logs would make it sufficient to detect
intrusions. Analyzing the data even after an attack has taken place to decide the degree of
damage sustained is trivial. This examination also plays a significant role in tracking
down the intruders and recording the attack patterns for future detections. A well
designed IDS that can be used to analyze audit data for such insights makes a valuable
tool for information systems. The idea behind anomaly detection is to establish each
user's normal activity profile, and to flag deviations from the established profile as
possible intrusion attempts. A main issue concerning misuse detection is the signature
development that includes all possible attacks to avoid false negatives, and the signature
development that does not match non-intrusive activities to avoid false positives. Though,
false negatives are frequently considered more serious. The selection of threshold levels
is important, so that neither of the above problems is unreasonablymagnified [34].
A number of IDS commercial tools are widely available for security specialists
nowadays. Most of them deal with the misuse detection model. The main problem with
such systems is their low flexible, as it was mentioned before. So, they are not capable of
detecting new, unknown, novel behavior, and require constant update by vendors.
The US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) has sponsored a large-
scale realistic Intrusion Detection database in 1998 to improve performance of IDS
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systems with real network traffic. More than two months of traffic observed from the US
Government sites and the Internet was registered, adding attacks against various hosts
OS. DARPA database was designed to evaluate performances of Intrusion Detection
Systems. The first evaluation with offline and real time database was conducted in the
summer of 1998 [15].
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4 Artificial Intelligence Techniques in Intrusion Detection
Classical network based approaches to the problem of detection network borne intrusions
often rely on either rule-based misuse detection or anomaly detection [5]. Rule-based
misuse detection systems attempt to recognize specific behaviors that represent known
forms of abuse or intrusion. Typically, they require an exhaustive list of templates
characterizing each attack instance; there is no concept of similarity to a currently listed
attack instance. On the other hand, anomaly detection attempts to recognize abnormal
user behavior. Actually, it identifies
"normal"
behaviors by mining the monitored
behavior of each user so that
"abnormal"
behaviors can be characterized.
One of the most interesting researches in the area of Intrusion Detection deals with the
applications of the Artificial Intelligence (AI) techniques. The most valuable feature of
any AI system is the ability to learn automatically according to data inputs and outputs.
This characteristic potentially can add more flexibility to Intrusion Detection Systems
and remove the necessity to update the database of possible attacks constantly. At this
point we talk not just about an IDS, but about Intelligent Intrusion Detection System
(IIDS), which is capable of creating attack patterns, i.e. learning about new attacks, based
on previous experience.
Multiple experiments were held to apply Artificial Techniques in
Intrusion Detection.
The main goal was to create a system that is capable of detecting different kinds of
attacks. The researchers used DARPA [15] and KDD Cups [26] benchmark databases for
26
training and detecting attacks in the experiments. In this chapter we discuss the




Neural Networks approach is one of the most interesting in this area. An increasing
amount of research in the last few years has investigated the application of neural
networks to intrusion detection. If properly designed and implemented, neural networks
have the potential to address many of the problems encountered by rule-based
approaches. Neural networks were specifically proposed to learn the typical
characteristics of systems users and identify statistically significant variations from their
established behavior. In order to apply this approach to Intrusion Detection, we would
have to introduce data representing attacks and non-attacks to the Neural Network to
adjust automatically coefficients of this Network during the training phase. In other
words, it will be necessary to collect data representing normal and abnormal behavior and
train the Neural Network on those data. After training is accomplished, a certain number
ofPerformance tests with real network traffic and attacks should be conducted.
Supervised Learning Model
Lippmann and Cunningham of MIT Lincoln Laboratory conducted a number of tests
employing Neural Networks to misuse detection [12, 13]. The system was searching for
attack-specific keywords in the network traffic. A Multi-layer Perceptron had been used
for detection UNIX host attacks, and attacks to obtain root-privilege on a server. The
system was trying to detect the presence of an attack by classifying the inputs into 2 (two)
outputs (normal and attack). The system was able to detect 80% of attacks - 17 out of 20
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attacks were identified. The main achievement of this system was its ability to detect old
as well as new attacks not included in the training data.
Unsupervised Learning Model
There were a couple of systems, which used Self Organizing Maps for detecting
intrusion. Luc Girardin's ofUBILAB laboratory performed clustering of network traffic
in order to detect attacks. A visual approach was chosen for attack association [21]. SOM
were employed to project network events on an appropriate 2D-space for visualization,
then the network administrator analyzed them. Intrusions were extracted from the view
by highlighting divergence from the norm with visual metaphors of network traffic. The
main disadvantage of this approach is its need in interpretation of network traffic by an
administrator or other authorized person to detect attacks.
Kayacik, Zincir-Heywood, and Heywood utilize KDD Cups data set for the experiments.
They create three layer of employment [25]:
1) First, individual SOM are associated with each basic TCP feature. This provides a
concise summary of the interesting properties of each basic feature, as derived
over a suitable temporal horizon.
2) Second, integrates the views provided by the first level SOM into a single view of
the problem. At this point, they use the training set labels associated with each
pattern to label the respective best matching unit in the second layer.
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3) Third, the final layer is built for those neurons, which win for both attack and
normal behaviors. This results in third layer SOMs being associated with specific
neurons in the second layer. Moreover, the hierarchical nature of the architecture
means that the first layer may be trained in parallel and the third layer SOMs are
only trained over a small fraction of the data set.
Normal DoS Probe U2R R2L
Level 2 92.4 96.5 12.% 22.9 11.3
Level 1 95.4 95.1 64.3 10.0 9.9
Table 1. Performance of 2 and 3 layer hierarchy on different categories
The table above describes the detection of attacks by category performed by the authors.
They also performed individual attack detection. In the table below we can see the
individual attack detection rates.















Table 2. Detection rate of new attacks for 2-layer and 3-layer hierarchy
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Hybrid Networks
Several researchers have combined MLP and SOM in their attempt to create an Intrusion
Detection System. Cannady and Mahaffey of Georgia Technical Research Institute and
Fox, Henning, and Reed have performed a research to apply Multi-Layer Perceptron
model and Self-Organizing Map for misuse detection [10, 19, 35]. They have used a
feed-forward network with back-propagation learning, which contained 4 fully connected
layers, 9 input nodes and 2 output nodes (normal and attack). The network has been
trained for a certain number of attacks. The network has succeeded in identifying attacks
it was trained for.
Bivens believes that DOS and other network-based attacks leave a faint trace of their
presence in the network traffic data. He has designed modular network-based intrusion
detection system that analyzes TCP dump data to develop windowed traffic intensity
trends, which detects network-based attacks by carefully analyzing this network traffic
data and alerting administrators to abnormal traffic trends. It has been shown that
network traffic can be efficiently modeled using artificial neural networks [3, 12, 13],
therefore MLP was chosen to examine network traffic data. SOM has been used to group
network traffic together to present it to the neural network, as SOM have been shown to
be effective in novelty detection [21, 25, 43].
The data that they have presented to the neural network consisted of attack-specific
keyword counts in network traffic [32]. This system reminds a host-based detection
system because it looks at the user actions. The Neural Network was created to analyze
program behavior profiles instead of user behavior profiles [20]. This method identifies
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the normal system behavior of certain programs and compares it to the current system
behavior. The author has used DARPA benchmark for the experiments. The prediction
rate of the system is 24% - 100%. 100% has been achieved only with one attack in the
training set
- sshprocesstable [7, 9].
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4.2 Rule-BasedApproach
Agarwal and Joshi propose a two-stage general-to-specific framework for learning a rule-
based model (PNrule) to learn classifier models on a data set that has widely different
class distributions in the training data [1]. They utilized KDD Cups database for training
and testing their system. The system was classifying the attacks into 4 main groups:
Probing
- information gathering
Denial of Service (DOS) - deny legitimate requests to the system
User-to-Root (U2R) - unauthorized access to local super-user or root
Remote-to-Local (R2L) - unauthorized local access from a remote machine
As the result, the system performed very well on detecting Probing and DOS attacks
identifying 73.2% and 96.6% respectively. 6.6% of U2R attacks were detected and
10.7% of R2L. False alarms were generated at a level of less than 10% for all attack
categories except for U2R - an unacceptably high level of 89.5% false alarm rate was
reported for this category
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4.3 Decision-TreeApproach
Levin creates a set of locally optimal decision trees (decision forest) from which optimal
subset of trees (sub-forest) is selected for predicting new cases [31]. 10% ofKDD Cups
database is used for training and testing. Data is randomly sampled from the entire
training data set. Multi-class detection approach is used to detect different attack
categories in the KDD data set. Just like Agarwal and Joshi [1], Levin tries to classify the
data into four main categories: Probing, DOS, U2R, and R2L. The final trees give very
high detection rates for all classes including the R2L in the entire training data set. In
particular, 84.5% detection rate for Probing, 97.5% for DOS, 1 1.8% for U2R, and 7.32%
for R2L. The following false alarm rates were detected for Probing, DOS, U2R and R2L
attack categories respectively
- 21.6%, 73.1%, 36.4%, and 1.7%.
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4.4 SharedNearestNeighbor and K-Means Approach
Ertoz used shared nearest neighbor technique (SNN) that is particularly suited for finding
clusters in data of different sizes, density, and shapes, mainly when the data contains
large amount of noise and outliers. All attack records are selected from the KDD training
and testing data sets with a count of 10,000 records from each attack type: there are a
total of 36 attack types from 4 attack categories. Also, 10,000 records were randomly
picked from both the training and the testing data sets. In total, around 97,000 records
were selected from the entire KDD data set. After removing duplicate KDD records, the
data set size reduced to 45,000 records [18]. The author is utilizing two main clustering
algorithms: K-Means, where the number of clusters is equal to 300, and SNN. K-Means
performed very well on Probing, DOS, and R2L, detecting 91.8%, 98.75%, and 77.04%
respectively. Detection rate for U2R is 5.6%. SNN performed in the following manner:
73.48% for Probing, 77.76% for DOS, 37.82% for U2R, and 68.15% for R2L. False
alarms are not discussed by the author.
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4.5 Parzen-WindowApproach
Yeung and Chow propose a novelty detection approach using non-parametric density
estimation based on Parzen-window estimators with Gaussian kernels to build an
intrusion detection system using normal data only. This novelty detection approach was
employed to detect attack categories in the KDD data set [42]. 30,000 randomly sampled
normal records from the KDD training data set were used as training data set to estimate
the density of the model. 30,000 randomly sampled normal records (also from the KDD
training data set) formed the threshold determination set, which had no overlap with the
training data set. The results were very high in most cases: 99.17% detection ofProbing,
96.71% of DOS, 93.57% of U2R, and 31.17% of R2L. No false alarms information is
available. The main advantage of this technique is its capability of detecting an attack,
not just classifying the attacks.
36
4.6Multi-ClassifierApproach
Sabhnani and Serpen of the University of Toledo conduct a number of experiments with
hybrid systems that contained different approaches for attack classification. KDD Cups
database is chosen for the experiments. The attacks are classified into four main groups,
as was done by the researchers discussed in prior chapters:
Probing
- information gathering
Denial ofService (DOS) - deny legitimate requests to the system
User-to-Root (U2R)
- unauthorized access to local super-user or root
Remote-to-Local (R2L)
- unauthorized local access from a remote machine
They highlight that most researchers employ a single algorithm to detect multiple
attack
categories with dismal performance in some cases. So, they propose to use a specific
detection algorithm that is associated with an attack category for which it is the most
promising [37].
Attributes in the KDD datasets had all forms - continuous, discrete, and symbolic, with
significantly varying resolution and ranges. Most
pattern classification methods are not
able to process data in such a format. Hence, preprocessing was required. The
preprocessing includes the following steps:
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1) Mapping symbolic-valued attributes to numeric-valued attributes. Symbolic
features like protocoltype (3 different symbols), service (70 different symbols),
and flag (1 1 different symbols) were mapped to integer values ranging from 0 to
N-l where N is the number of symbols. Attack names, such as buffer_overflow,
were mapped to one of the five classes:
a. Normal was mapped to 0
b. Probing was mapped to 1
c. DOS was mapped to 2
d. U2R was mapped to 3
e. 4 - R2L as described in [ 1 7]
2) Scaling.
a. Each of the mapped features was linearly scaled to the range [0.0, 1 .0].
b. Features having smaller integer value ranges like duration [0, 58329],
wrong fragment [0, 3], urgent [0, 14], hot[0, 101], num_failed_logins [0,
5], numcompromised [0, 9], su_attemptes [0, 2], num_root [0, 7468],
num_file_creations [0, 100], num_shells [0, 5], num_access_files [0, 9],
count [0, 511], srvcount [0, 511], dst_host_count [0, 255], and
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dst_host_srv_count [0, 255] were also scaled linearly to the range of [0,
!]
c. Logarithmic scaling (base 10) was applied to two features spanned over a
very large integer range, namely src_bytes [0, 1.3 billion] and dtsbytes
[0, 1.3 billion], to reduce the range to [0, 9.14].
d. All other features were either Boolean, like loggedin, having values (0 or
1), or continuous, like diff_srv_rate, in the range of [0,1]. No scaling was
necessary for these attributes
3) For the purpose of training different classifier models, all duplicate records are
removed from the datasets. The total number of records in the original labeled
training dataset is 972, 780 for normal; 41, 102 for Probe; 3,883,370 for DOS; 52
for U2R and 999 for R2L attack classes.
All simulations are performed on a multi-user Sun SPARC machine, which has dual
microprocessors, ULTRASPARC-II, running at 400 MHz. System clock frequency is
equal to 100MHz., the system had 512 MB ofRam and Solaris 8 operating system.
9 distinct pattern recognition and machine learning algorithms are tested:
1) MLP. 3 layers of Feed Forward Neural Network are implemented. Sigmoid is
used as the transfer function and stochastic gradient decent with mean squared
error function as the learning algorithm. The network has 41 (forty one) inputs; 5
outputs; 40
- 80 nodes in the hidden layer; 0.1 - 0.6 learning rate (0.1 the final
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rate); 500,000 samples in each epoch; and 30-150 epochs (60 the final number
of epochs).
2) Gaussian classifier (GAU). This classifier assumes inputs are uncorrected and
distributions for different classes differ only in mean values. It is based on the
Bayes decision theorem [16].
3) K-means clustering (K-M). This algorithm [16] positions K centers in the pattern
space such that the total squared error distance between each training pattern and
the nearest center is minimized.
4) Nearest cluster algorithm (NEA). It is a condensed version ofK-nearest neighbor
clustering algorithm [16]. Input to this algorithm is a set of cluster centers
generated from the training data set using standard clustering algorithms like
K-
means, E & M binary split, and leader algorithm. In this case, the initial clusters
were created using the K-means.
5) Incremental Radial Basis Function (IRBF). Can perform non-linear mapping
between input and output vectors similar to RBF andMLP [22].
6) Leader algorithm (LEA). LEA partitions are a set of M records into K disjoint
clusters (where M>K) [23]. First input record forms the leader of the first cluster.
Each input record is sequentially compared with current leader clusters. If the
distance measure between the current record and all leader records is greater than
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the threshold (delta), a new cluster is formed with the current record being the
cluster leader.
7) Hyper sphere algorithm (HYP). This algorithm creates decision boundaries using
spheres in input feature space [6] [30]. Any pattern that falls within the sphere is
classified in the same class as that of the center pattern. Spheres are created using
an initial defined radius. Euclidian distance between a pattern and sphere centers
is used to test whether a pattern falls in one of the current defined spheres.
8) Fuzzy ARTMAP (ART). Adaptive Resonance Theory mapping algorithm is used
for supervised learning ofmultidimensional data [11]. It uses two ART's - ARTa
and ARTb. ARTa maps features into clusters. ARTb maps output categories into
clusters. There is a mapping from ARTa clusters to ARTb clusters that is
performed during training.
9) C4.5 decision tree (C4.5). This algorithm was developed by Quinlan [39]. It
generates decision trees using an information theoretic methodology. The goal is
to construct a decision tree with minimum number of nodes that gives least
number of misclassifications on training data. Divide and conquer strategy is
utilized in this algorithm. The publicly available pattern classification software
tool LNKnet is used to simulate pattern recognition and machine learning models
[33]. The C4.5 algorithm is employed to generate decision trees using the
software tool obtained at [8].
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Probe DoS U2R R2L
MLP PD 88.7% 97.2% 13.2% 5.6%
FAR 0.4% 0.3% 0.1% 0.1%
GAU PD 90.2% 82.4% 22.8% 0.1%
FAR 11.3% 0.9% 0.5% 0.1%
K-M PD 87.6% 97.3% 29.8% 6.4%
FAR 2.6% 0.4% 0.4% 0.1%
NEA PD 88.8% 97.1% 2.2% 3.4%
FAR 0.5% 0.3% 0.1% 0.1%
RBF PD 93.2% 73% 6.1% 5.9%
FAR 18.8% 0.2% 0.4% 0.3%
LEA PD 83.8% 97.2% 8.3% 1%
FAR 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.1%
HYP PD 84.8% 97.2% 8.3% 1%
FAR 0.4% 0.3% 0.1% 0.1%
ART PD 77.2% 97% 6.1% 3.7%
FAR 0.2% 0.3% 0.1% 0.1%
C4.5 PD 80.8% 97% 1.8% 4.6%
FAR 0.7% 0.3% 0.1% 0.1%
Table 3. Multi - Classifier Results for separate algorithms
In the table above we can see the results of the experiments held by the authors. Here PD
represents Probability ofDetection, and FAR
- False Alarm Rate. They state that the set
of pattern recognition and machine learning algorithms tested on the KDD data sets
offers an acceptable level ofmisuse detection performance for only two attack categories
- Probing and DOS. On the other hand, all nine classification algorithms fail to
demonstrate an acceptable level of detection performance for the remaining two attack
categories that are U2R and R2L. Thus, [37] offers a multi-classifier model: they propose
to have sub-classifiers trained using different algorithms for each attack
category. They
offer the best algorithm for each category:
1) MLP for probing




The results are depicted in the table below, where we can see the improvement in the
performance of the system overall.
Probe DoS U2R R2L
Multi-
Classifier
Pos Detection 88.7% 97.3% 29.8% 9.6%
False Alarms 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.1%
Table 4.Multi-Classifier Results for the final system
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5 Experiments
At this point we have accomplished the investigation of the related research and have
compared the results achieved by those researchers. Figure 5 demonstrates the workflow
of the process of this effort that requires learning the problem, collecting of the
data/benchmarks with known results from other researcher, and the experiments
conduction. At this stage we have finished researching the problem and managed to get
the data that was used by the previous investigators. Now, knowing the results of
previous work, we need to prepare the data and hold the experiments. We have come




































Figure 5. Process Workflow.
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5.1 Data
To conduct the experiments, it was decided to use the benchmarks of the International
Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining group (KDD). These data are based on the
benchmark of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) that was
collected by the Lincoln Laboratory ofMassachusetts Institute of Technology in 1998,
and was the first initiative to provide designers of Intrusion Detection Systems with a
benchmark, on which to evaluate different methodologies [15]. In order to collect these
data, a simulation had been made of a factitious military network consisting of three
"target"
machines running various operating systems and services. Additional three
machines were then used to spoof different IP addresses, thus generating traffic between
different IP addresses. Finally, a sniffer was used to record all network traffic using the
TCP dump format. The total simulated period was seven weeks. Normal connections
were created to profile that expected in amilitary network and attacks fall into one of five
categories: User to Root (U2R), Remote to Local (R2L), Denial of Service (DOS), Data,
and Probe. Packets information in the TCP dump files were summarized into
connections. Specifically, a connection was a sequence of TCP packets starting and
ending at some well defined times, between which data flows from a source IP address to
a target IP address under some well defined protocol [24]. In 1999 the original TCP dump
files were preprocessed for utilization in the IDS benchmark of the International
Knowledge Discovery and DataMining Tools Competitions [24].
Format
The data consists of a number ofbasic features:
46
1 . Duration of the connection.
2. Protocol type, such as TCP, UDP or ICMP.
3. Service type, such as FTP, HTTP, Telnet.
4. Status flag.
5. Total bytes sent to destination host.
6. Total bytes sent to source host.
7. Whether source and destination addresses are the same or not.
8. Number ofwrong fragments.
9. Number ofurgent packets.
In addition to the above nine "basic features", each connection is also described in terms
of an additional 32 derived features, falling into three categories:
1. Content features: Domain knowledge is used to assess the payload of the original
TCP packets. This includes features such as the number of failed login attempts.
2. Time-based traffic features: these features are designed to capture properties that
mature over a 2 second temporal window. One example of such a feature would
be the number of connections to the same host over the 2 second interval.
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3 . Host-based Traffic features: utilize a historical window estimated over the number
of connections
- in this case 100 - instead of time. Host based features are
therefore designed to assess attacks, which span intervals longer than 2 seconds.
Each record consists of 41 attributes and one target [28, 29]. The target value indicates
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Figure 7. Data Fields.
Optimization
In order to perform formatting and optimization of the data, a tool was written that is
capable of completing such operations as computing data statistics, data conversion, data
optimization, neural network input creation, and other data preparation related
assignments.
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Figure 8. Data Preparation Tool
Based on the results produced by the Preparation Tool, we made the following
classifications:
Each record consists of 41 attributes and one target. The target value indicates the
attack name.
The data has 4,898,43 1 records in the dataset.
3,925,650 (80.14%) records represent attacks that fall into one of the five
mentioned above categories.
Total 22 attacks were identified.
972,781 (19.85%) records ofnormal behavior were found.
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The following attacks were identified:
1 . Buffer overflow - 30 records.
2. Loadmodule - 9 records.
3. Perl - 3 records.
4. Neptune - 1 ,072,01 7 records.
5. Smurf- 2,807,886 records.
6. Guess Password - 53 records.






- 12, 481 records.
1 1 . Land - 2 1 records.
12. FTP Write - 8 records.
13. Back - 2,203 records.
51
14. IMAP- 12 records.
15. Satan - 15,892 records.
16. PHF- 4 records.
17. NMAP- 2,316 records.
1 8. Multihop
- 7 records.
19. Warezmaster - 20 records.
20. Warezclient - 1020 records.
21. Spy -2 records.
22. Rootkit - 10 records.
Figure 9 shows the graphical representation of these attacks in the dataset. As it is
possible to see, the attacks are not distributed evenly. Some attacks, such as Smurf, are

























Figure 9. KDD Data.
Attributes in the KDD datasets have all forms - continuous, discrete, and symbolic, with
significantly varying resolution and ranges. Most pattern classification methods are not
able to process data in such a format. Therefore, preprocessing is required to transform
the data into themost optimal format acceptable by the neural networks.
First of all, the dataset was split into multiple files. Each file contained records
corresponding to a certain attack or normal behavior. Thus, a library of attacks was
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created. It was done to achieve an efficient way to format, optimize, and compose custom
training and testing datasets.
Second, symbolic features like attack name (23 different symbols), protocol type (three
different symbols), service (70 different symbols), and flag (1 1 different symbols) were
mapped to integer values ranging from 0 to N-l whereN is the number of symbols.
Third, a certain scaling had taken place:
Each of the mapped features was linearly scaled to the range [0.0, 1 .0].
Features having integer value ranges like duration, wrongfragment, urgent, hot,
num_failed_logins, numcompromised, suattemptes, numroot,
num_file_creations, num_shells, num_access_files, count, srv_count,
dsthostcount, dst_host_srv_count, srcbytes, and dts_bytes were also scaled
linearly to the range of [0, 1].
All other features were either Boolean, like logged_in, having values (0 or 1), or
continuous, like diff_srv_rate, in the range of [0,1]. No scaling was necessary for
these attributes.




Figure 10 shows the final data set that was processed by the means of the Preparation
Tool. All string values were mapped, integer values were scaled in the range of [0, 1],
and all Boolean values remain untouched. Therefore, the dataset was prepared for the use
by the Neural Networks.
2*&MSPJV -M545* * * * * o. oJ . o. o. o. 0, o. a os a o. a
0.00& o.oos. os o, o8 os 0.1 . 0, 0. 0.009, ojooo. 0.1, 0, 0.01 1. 0, 0, 0,
0,0
0, 0, 0, 0. 0,00239., 0.00486. 0. 0. 0, 0, 0, 0,1 . 08 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0..
o, o.oos, o.ooe, o, o, o. o, oj, o. o, aoi. 0,019, 0,1. 0, 0*00$, 0, 0.
0, 0, 0
0, a 0, 0, 0,00235, 0.01337. 0, Q, 0S 0, 08 0J . 0S 0, 0, 0. 0, 0, 0, 0S 0,
0, 0,0088 0.008, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,1 , 0, 0, 0,029, 0,029, 0J , 0, 0.003. 0, 0,
0, 0. 0
0, 0, 0, 0, 0.0021 9, 0J01337. 0. 0. 0, 0, 0, 0J . 0, 0, 0, 0. 0, 0, 0, 0, 0.
os o.ooa 0.006. o. o, o, o, 0.1 . o< 0, 0.039. 0.039. 0.1 , o> 0.003. 0, %
0. 0, 0
Figure 10. Final Dataset.
After the data formatting and optimization, a set of attacks that would be used in the
experiments was determined. The optimization process significantly decreased the
number of records for each of the attacks, thus, such attacks as RootKit, Spy, Multihop,
IMAP, etc do not have sufficient number of records for neither training the neural
networks, nor for testing, hence, all attacks with statistically insignificant amount of
records were omitted.
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Attacks with the most number of records were chosen to be in the training set. The













5.2 NeuralNetworks Based Intrusion Detection System
Experiments
It was decided to run the experiments in three stages. In stage one, it was important to
repeat the experiments of other researchers and have the Neural Networks to identify an
attack. In stage two the assignment was set to a more complicated goal. It was decided to
classify the attacks, thus, the Neural Networks had to determine not only the presence of
an attack, but the attack itself. Stage three had to repeat the experiments of stage two, but
in this stage a set of unknown attacks are added to the testing set. Stage three contains
experiments of a higher complexity and interest. It should be noted that the normal
behavior records are viewed as a
"normal"
attack. MatLab was chosen to run simulations
with Neural Networks.
RBF
Each RBF Neural Network had 41 inputs, corresponding to each attribute in the dataset,
two outputs for attack detection (the first output for the presence of an attack
- "YES",
the second output for the normal behavior - "NO"), or six outputs for attack classification
(five outputs for the attacks, and the sixth output for the normal behavior), three layers
(input, hidden, and output). The training set consisted of4000 records. The attack and the
normal behavior records were evenly distributed in the training set.
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MLP
The parameters of theMLP Neural Network were as follows:
41 inputs, corresponding to each attribute in the dataset
two outputs for attack detection (the first output for the presence of an attack -
"YES", the second output for the normal behavior - "NO"), or six outputs for
attack classification (five outputs for the attacks, and the sixth output for the
normal behavior)
three layers (input, hidden, and output)





function is used in the input layer node,
"purelin"
in the hidden and
output layer nodes
50 epochs
The training set consisted of 4000 records. The attack and the normal behavior
records were evenly distributed in the training set.
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Before the parameters were set for the Multiple Layer Perceptron, it was optimized. We
tried 5-150 nodes in the hidden layer. 20 nodes had the best performance, thus it was
decided to limit the number of nodes to this amount. Alpha and beta rates were tested in




were chosen as the best fitting ones. Number of epochs was limited to 50,
since the network's performance was decreasing significantlywithmore epochs.
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5.3 Results
First Stage - Known Attacks Detection
The first stage of the experiments consisted of 2 phases. At this stage only one attack was
used in the training set. The distribution of an attack and normal records was 50% - 50%.
Table 5 and Figure 1 1 represent the results of these experiments. As it is shown, the
accuracy ofpositive recognition is very high for both Neural Networks. All of the attacks












Smurf 100% 0 99.5% 0
Neptune 100% 0 100% 0
Satan 91% 7% 97.2% 2%
IP Sweep 99.5% 0 99.9% 0
Back 100% 0 100% 0
Table 5. One AttackDataset Results.
This phase is considered to be the easiest one since there is only one attack per normal.
Having an even distribution of normal and one of the attack's records makes it
straightforward for both neural networks to distinguish between the two. The goal of this
phase is to show that the normal records could be told apart of the abnormal records, thus
attacks. The success of this stage lets us conclude that each attack is indeed different in
its pattern and activity from the normal behavior.
60





D MLP False Alarms
Figure 11. First Phase of the First Stage Graph.
For the second phase of the first stage of the experiments, five different attacks were used
in the training set. Normal behavior records, as it was mentioned before, was considered
as an attack, thus total of six attacks were used in this stage. In order to proceed to the
next level of the experiments, attack classification, it was important to prove that the
attacks are distinguishable not only one from another, as it was shown in the first stage,
but also, one from the group of others. Therefore, six different experiments were held to
prove this idea. 50% of the training set consisted of the concentrated attack, i.e. the attack
that had to be differentiated from the others. Other 50% were evenly distributed between
other attacks, i.e. 10% per attack. For example, normal behavior records needed to be
defined. 50% of the training set for this assignment consisted of the records of normal
behavior and other 50% contained records of Smurf, Neptune, Satan, IP Sweep, and Back
attacks. All records were in random order. Table 6 and Figure 12 demonstrate the results
of this experiment. As shown in the table, the accuracy for differentiating the attacks is
quite high for both Neural Networks. The lowest accuracy is 91% for Satan and the
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highest is 100% for Smurf, Neptune, and Back. These results let us make a conclusion











Smurf 100% 0 99.5% 0
Neptune 100% 0 100% 0
Satan 91% 7% 97.2% 2%
IP Sweep 99.5% 0 99.9% 0
Back 100% 0 100% 0
Normal 98.0% 1% 96.8% 2%
Table 6. Five AttackDataset Results.
The main purpose of this stage was to show that neural networks are capable of
differentiating between attacks, thus can single out an attack, or normal behavior pattern
from a set of records. Due to the chosen approach, even distribution between the
detecting attack and the group of the attacks, we managed to train the neural networks so
that they would be able to successfully identify the trained attack. Both neural networks
performed very well. They managed to detect attacks on a high level, showing 90%
-
100% accuracy.






Figure 12. Second Phase of the First Stage Results.
Before going to the next stage, it was decided to enlarge this experiment and introduce
new attacks to the training set. A neural network, which was trained to detect normal
behavior, was chosen for this purpose. New attacks were added to the testing set:
PortSweep andWarezClient. Neither of the neural networks was trained for these attacks.
It was interesting to see their reaction to this introduction.
Radial Basis Neural Network successfully picked up both of the attacks, detecting 93.9%
of the PortSweep attack, and 96% of the WarezClient attack. Multi Layer Perceptron
Neural Network managed to detect 86.6% of PortSweep, and 96.1% ofWarezClient. In
both cases false alarm rate was under 5%.
In conclusion of the second stage, it is possible to state that we managed to create a
neural network intrusion detection system that is capable of identifying attacks that were
included into the training set as well as the attacks that were not included into the training
set, thus new or unknown attacks. To take the experiments to the next level, we
introduce the second stage.
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Second Stage - Known Attacks Classification
For the second stage of the experiments Neural Networks with six outputs were used. At
this level there was an attempt to create an Intrusion Detection System that is capable of
classifying the attacks. A dataset of five attacks and normal behavior records were used.
The attacks were evenly distributed in the dataset. Table 7 and Figure 13 demonstrate the
results of this experiment. As we can see the accuracy of classifying attacks is 93.2%
using RBF Neural Network and 92.2% using MLP Neural Network. The results were
very close and the difference is statistically insignificant. In most cases the Networks
managed to classify an attack correctly. The false alarm rate (false positive) is very low in
both cases, missed attacks rate (false negative) is not high either, and the misidentified
attacks rate (misclassification of the attacks) is 5%-6%. Overall, it is possible to conclude
that both Neural Networks managed to accomplish the second stage of the experiments
and were capable of classifying the attacks. Therefore, the environment for the third stage
of the experiments was set.




RBF 93.2% 0.8% 0.6% 5.4%
MLP 92.2% 0 2.1% 5.7%
Table 7. Attacks Classification Results.
After the success of the first stage, we show that neural networks not only capable of
identifying attacks and normal behavior, but also are able to classify attacks. We are not
introducing new, unknown attacks yet, leaving them for the third stage, but we observe
the
networks'
behavior in dealing with multiple attacks and their classification. As it is
























Figure 13. Second Stage Results.
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Third Stage - Unknown Attacks Identification
For the third and the final stage of the experiments we used the trained Neural Networks
from the second stage. The Networks were trained to classify the following attacks:
Smurf, Neptune, Satan, IP Sweep, Back, and Normal behavior records. At this point we
proceeded with the most interesting and exciting phase of the experiments - untrained
(unknown) attack classification and identification. As it was mentioned earlier, five
attacks were chosen to be used for this purpose: Buffer Overflow, Guess Password,
NMap, Teardrop, and Warezclient. Datasets of these attacks were sent into the trained
Neural Networks. Table 8 and Figure 14 demonstrate the results. As the table shows,
RBF neural network managed to identify the unknown attacks as one of the trained
attacks inmost cases. As for the MLP Neural Network, it succeeded only with NMap and
Guess Password attacks. In other cases it identified the attacks as normal behavior. Thus,
RBF displayed more capabilities in identifying unknown attacks while MLP failed in
some cases.
Attack Name MLP RBF
Buffer Overflow 53.3% 96.6%




Table 8. Unknown Attacks Classification Results.
At the final stage we introduced unknown attacks to the trained neural networks. It was
interesting to see how these networks would react to this introduction. As we can see,
Radial Basis Neural Network new attacks on a very high level, thus we can conclude that
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the goal of this stage is fulfilled. At this point to go on with the analysis of the achieved
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Figure 14. Third Stage Results.
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Result Comparison
As the previous research indicates, there were many attempts to detect and classify
attacks. The winner of the last KDD intrusion detection competition, Dr. Bernhard
Pfahringer of the Austrian Research Institute for Artificial Intelligence, used C5 decision
trees, the second-place performance was achieved by Itzhak Levin from LLSoft using
Kernel Miner tool, and the third-place contestants, VladimirMiheev, Alexei Vopilov, and
Ivan Shabalin of the company MP 13, used a decision tree based expert system [26]. The
winner was determined based on the cost of the system, while the results were marginally
close. Also, we note the results of the most recent research made by Maheshkumar
Sabhnani and Gursel Serpen of the Ohio University who used a multi classify model to
achieve even better results than the winner of the KDD Cups contest [37]. Table 9 and
Figure 15 compare the mentioned above results. As we can see, in some cases accuracy
of the classification is as low as 8.4%, which is totally not acceptable. The main problem
with the approach they had chosen was that they used all attacks in the dataset, though
many of those attacks did not have enough records for training, as we outlined after the
data formatting and optimization took place. If an attack does not have enough presence
(IMAP attack had only 12 records), it should not be used for training. Also, they grouped
the attacks, what potentially can lead to a misdetection since not all of the attacks in the
same group have identical signatures and patterns. Thus, a different approach was chosen
to detect and classify attack. The main advantage of this approach was data formatting
and the training dataset grouping, which allowed us to increase the accuracy rate up to
100% in some cases, and, the most important advantage, to achieve a high percentage of
identification of the attacks that were not included into the training set.
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Probe DoS U2R R2L
KDD Cup
Winner
Accuracy 83.3% 97.1% 13.2% 8.4%
False Alarms 0.6% 0.3% 0.1% 0.1%
KDD Cup
RunnerUp
Accuracy 83.3% 97.1% 13.2% 8.4%
FalseAlarms 0.6% 0.3% 0.1% 0.1%
Multi-
Classifier
Accuracy 88.7% 97.3% 29.8% 9.6%
False Alarms 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.1%
Table 9. Result Comparison.
Multi-Classifier
KDD Cups Winner
m KDD Cups Winner
m KDD Cups Runner Up
? Multi-Classifier
Figure 15. Result Comparison.
To make an objective comparison of the
systems'
results, it was decided to evaluate the
average performance of each system. Table 10 and Figure16 demonstrate and graphically
show the achieved comparison.
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Avg. Accuracy Avg. False Alarms
KDD CupsWinner 50.5% 0.275%
KDD Cups Runner Up 50.5% 0.275%
Multi-Classifier 56.35% 0.325%
MLP IDS 63.34% 0.315%
RBF IDS 93.3% 0.422%
Table 10. Comparison of the Averages.
As it shown in the table, we took the average performance of each system. KDD Cups
Winner, Runner UP, and Multi-Classifier Model was averaged based on their
performance in classifying the attacks into 4 different groups. MLP and RBF IDSs were
averaged based on their performance in classifying the attacks and detecting and
classifying the unknown attack. As it is shown in the graph and the table, it is possible to
see that the average performance of the systems is increasing significantly with each
development. At the early stage, KDD Cups Competition, which was held back in the
1999-2000, the average performance of the system was 50.5%. The next generation of the
IDS managed to increase its performance to 53.35%. And now, with our approach to data
formatting, optimization, and training, it is possible to create a system that is capable of
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Figure 16. Comparison of the Averages.
To explain the better results we have to show the difference between our approach and
the approach of other researchers. First, we have chosen a different strategy in
preprocessing. Before using the dataset, we made a thorough analysis of the given data.
We found out that there are a lot of repeated records. It was obvious that some attacks,
such as Smurfwere taking more than 50% of the whole dataset, and some attacks have
only 10 or even less records. To optimize the dataset, to make it appropriate for the
training and testing, we wrote a tool that was capable of resolving mentioned above
problems and prepare the dataset for the neural networks to use. So, the dataset was
optimized: repeated records were removed, dataset was split into multiple files, one
attack per file. After the statistics were computed, we chose those attacks that had more
representation in the dataset, thus the attacks with insignificant number of records were
omitted.
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The second very important difference was the training set composition. After the records
were converted into the neural network readable form, i.e. all values were mapped and
scaled into the range [0: 1], we created training sets, trying to keep the even distribution of
the attacks in the set. In other words, if it is important to identify a normal behavior from
the set of records, the records of the normal behavior has to take 50% of the training set.
Other 50% should be evenly distributed in the group of attacks.
Third, we chose to classify each attack, when others were trying to classify the attacks
into different groups. Group classification could potentially lead to a confusion, since
though the attack belong to the same group, i.e. trying to achieve the same goal, they
have different signatures, patterns, and set of actions, thus could be misclassified.
Overall, due to neural networks optimization, removing attacks with insignificant number
of records, removing repeated records, and taking a single attack approach instead of a
group approach we managed to show better results than the results of other researchers.
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6 Conclusion
As it was mentioned before, Computer Security remains one of the most researched fields
in the area ofComputer Science. Modern commercially used Intrusion Detection Systems
employ the techniques of expert systems that require constant updates from the vendors.
These updates make the IDS static, not flexible, and not capable of detecting new attacks
without new batches. To improve the security, a lot of researchers put efforts to utilize
Artificial Intelligence techniques in the area of Intrusion Detection, in order to create
systems capable of detecting unknown attacks, or/and learning new patterns by
themselves.
Benchmarks were created to standardize and compare the work of different investigators
of this problem. Competitions were held to attract the attention of new researchers. In the
most cases Neural Networks were used to detect attacks, and decision making trees were
used to classify them.
The results and conclusions of previous researchers demonstrate the superiority of
Decision Making Trees for attack classification, though in some cases even these trees
were not able to perform in classifying the attacks on a high level.
After extensive study, we decided to come up with a unique solution, and approached the
problem with a new dataset formatting and optimization technique. A library of attacks
was created. This library was based on the benchmark provided by the MIT Lincoln Lab
that was optimized by the KDD Cups. After the data was carefully formatted and
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optimized, it was decided to use and compare two different Neural Networks in attack
detection and classification. Neural Networks were chosen due to their abilities to learn
and classify. Trained Neural Networks can make decisions quickly, making it possible to
use them in real-time detection.
Both Networks managed to perform well on the known set of attacks, i.e. attacks that
they were trained to identify and classify. After new attacks were added to the testing set,
i.e. attacks that were not included into the training set, Radial Basis Function Neural
Network performed significantly better thanMultiple Layer Perceptron with the detection
rate between 80% and 100%, and the false alarm rate not greater than 2%.
When we compared these results to the results of previous work, it was notable that the
chosen technique had its advantages. First of all, we managed to correctly detect the
attacks. Second, classification of the trained attacks was successful with the rate of 90-
100%. Third, and the most important, we were able to detect new unknown attacks,
which were not included into the training set. The accuracy of detecting new unknown
attacks was between 80% and 100%.
After the work is done we conclude that with appropriate data formatting, optimization,
and dataset composition, Neural Networks display a very good performance and potential
in detecting and classifying trained attack, as well as new unknown attacks that were not
included into the training set. Thus, themain goal of this researchwas accomplished.
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